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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent wave of ￿nancial crises has challenged the role of international ￿nancial institutions
(IFIs) as crisis managers. IFIs’ rescue packages have faced criticism for different, and often
opposite, reasons. Whereas antiglobalizers accuse IFIs of providing distressed countries with
insuf￿cient resources to protect the poor, free-marketers blame the same IFIs for undermining
market discipline through their excessive largesse. While dif￿cult to reconcile ideologically, these
views can be encompassed in a framework that, using Mussa’s (1999) terminology, trades off the
real hazard arising as a combination of ￿nancial vulnerabilities and adverse external shocks, and
the moral hazard induced by international ￿nancial assistance. Evaluating the role of the IFIs
and its moral hazard consequences, however, requires a clear understanding of how international
safety nets in￿uence emerging markets’ incentives to undertake politically costly reforms that
may, in turn, affect their ￿nancial vulnerability in the future. This paper puts forward a stylized
analytic framework to identify these effects and assess their implications.
As Haldane and Taylor (2003) clearly point out:
IMF facilities can usefully be considered as a kind of insurance policy.[...] Liquidity crises
represent a real hazard that such insurance can help mitigate. In this role, IMF insurance
is clearly welfare enhancing. As with any insurance policy, however[...] mitigating the real
hazard of crises might at the same time aggravate the moral hazard of distorted incentives
(p. 122).
The question of whether such moral-hazard costs are so large that ￿the IMF might consider
changing its name to IMH￿the Institute for Moral Hazard￿ (Barro, 1998) or so small that
￿Argentina’s dif￿culty in obtaining IMF lending has to do with an overstating of the problem
of moral hazard￿ (Grif￿th-Jones, 2003), is an empirical one that, while already the subject of a
growing literature, remains elusive.
Zhang (1999) studies emerging market bond spreads before and after the Mexican bailout,
and ￿nds no evidence of moral hazard. Lane and Philips (2000) look at how emerging market
bond spreads, between 1995 and 1999, reacted to a number of IMF-related news, and only ￿nd
two (out of 22) episodes in which interest rate spread behavior was consistent with the moral
hazard hypothesis. One of these two episodes is the increase in emerging market spreads in the
aftermath of the 1998 Russian default. This event is analyzed by Dell’Ariccia and others (2002)
who estimate a structural model for emerging market bond spread and, in line with the moral
hazard hypothesis, show that the failed Russian bailout increased spread levels, their sensitivity to
fundamentals, and their cross-country dispersion.
Even if one accepts that international safety nets may create investor moral hazard, this does not
imply, as often suggested, that such moral hazard is necessarily at the expense of global taxpayers.
Indeed, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001) show that of￿cial crisis lending de facto involves virtually
no cost to the rest of the world. If this is the case, from a social planner’s perspective (alternatively,- 4 -
for the country as a whole) rescue packages should not be considered as state-contingent transfers
(as in a standard insurance policy) but rather as state-contingent loans, closer to a textbook lender
of last resort with limited moral hazard consequences.
As the borrower is ultimately the government, however, bailouts can still introduce an agency
problem between a borrowing government that does not fully internalize the future repayment of
the bailout, and the domestic taxpayers who ultimately foot the bill. Thus, even in the absence
of a subsidy component, one could point to a government moral hazard, namely ￿a discrepancy
between the policymaker’s objective and the domestic taxpayers’ long-term interests￿ (Jeanne
and Zettelmeyer, 2001, p. 412). In this case, as only a fraction of the cost is paid during a
policymaker’s period in of￿ce, bailouts preserve their insurance nature from the government’s
standpoint.
An additional aspect￿increasingly emphasized in the recent literature on emerging market
crises￿that needs to be brought into the picture is the incidence of external shocks largely beyond
the government’s control. Some observers have stressed the exogenous nature of sharp capital
￿ow reversals (￿sudden stops￿) attributable, for example, to ￿nancial contagion, changes in global
liquidity, or interest rates movements.
2 Others have pointed to the role of large terms of trade
shocks that, when combined with embedded vulnerabilities, may render an emerging country’s
debt unsustainable, triggering a run on the country’s assets.
3 Indeed, in ￿nancially vulnerable
emerging market economies, liquidity runs can be prompted by self-ful￿lling pessimistic
expectations, with little if any relation to a fundamental change in the economy.
4
The presence of exogenous factors should certainly qualify the role played by moral hazard in
triggering ￿nancial crises. More importantly, it in￿uences the trade-off between costly long-term
reforms and opportunistic short-term policies that is at the core of the debate on international
safety nets. Speci￿cally, as the political payoffs of reforms are severely reduced in the event of a
￿nancial collapse, the probability of facing an exogenous shock detracts from the incentives to
embrace long-term reforms in the ￿rst place. Conversely, if policymakers are provided with some
degree of insurance against exogenous factors, so that the reform effort is properly rewarded,
reform incentives might be strengthened.
This is indeed the main message of this paper. With a focus on government moral hazard in a
context in which crises depend both on the government’s actions and on exogenous factors, we
identify the implications that country insurance has for the policymaker’s incentives to implement
different types of reforms. Opting for a parsimonious framework allows us to encompass a
2The initial reference to sudden stops is Dornbusch and others (1995). The concept has been
recently developed by Calvo and others (2003).
3This line was highlighted by De la Torre and others (2003) and Perry and ServØn (2002) to
account for the recent Argentine crisis.
4The self-ful￿lling crisis view has been revived by Sachs and others (1996) to explain the Mexican
crises. It gained advocates after the Asian crises (see among others Radelet and Sachs, 1998 and
Chang and Velasco, 2001), and was given new theoretical fundations by Morris and Shin (1998).- 5 -
number of channels (some, but not all of them, addressed by the existing literature) through which
country insurance, by enhancing the returns on reform effort, reinforces reform incentives, despite
the presence of moral hazard.
In particular, country insurance strengthens the incentives to invest in those reforms whose
payoffs are negatively correlated with the probability of a crisis. Indeed, if the political returns
on reforms that enhance productivity and economic growth in the long run can be eroded by
episodes of ￿nancial distress driven by largely exogenous shocks, a high probability of facing
these shocks would tilt the government’s decision away from reform and towards short-term
policies with immediate payoffs. Insurance, by reducing the incidence of these shocks, restores
reform incentives. Not surprisingly, then, we ￿nd that insurance is more likely to stimulate reform
in crisis-prone volatile economies.
On the other hand, a crisis entails political costs to the government, both direct (through the
probability of being voted out of of￿ce) and indirect (through their deleterious consequences on
the real economy). Then, as long as reforms play a role in preventing ￿nancial crises or mitigating
their effects, insurance would relax the discipline induced by these costs. Ultimately, we ￿nd that
this moral hazard effect may offset the bene￿cial impact of insurance if the political costs of a
crisis are large enough.
When assessing the consequences of country insurance, our analysis also highlights the
importance of the nature of the reforms under consideration, and, speci￿cally, of the correlation
between reform payoffs and the macroeconomic environment. In particular, ￿buffering￿ reforms
that attenuate the costs of a crisis, at the expense of returns in good states, are partial substitutes
for the country insurance policies discussed above. By contrast, country insurance could be
particularly conducive to ￿enhancing￿ reforms that pay off relatively more in good times.
In the last part of the paper, we extend our analysis to address two additional channels recently
discussed in the literature, through which country insurance may strengthen reform incentives: (i)
an increase in the continuation value of policymakers, which, in turn, increases their incentives
to avoid a crisis; and (ii) a reduction of the incidence of self-ful￿lling crises unrelated to reform
effort, which strengthens the link between the policymaker’s decisions and the ￿nal outcome.
The ￿rst channel builds on Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003), who, in a banking model, show that a
central bank that commits to bailing out insolvent institutions in times of adverse macroeconomic
conditions creates a risk-reducing ￿value effect￿ that lessens both the frequency of bankruptcies
and overall bank risk. The second channel has been recently discussed by Corsetti and others
(2003) and Morris and Shin (2003). The ￿rst paper develops a model in which international
liquidity support can either generate debtor moral hazard or, by reducing liquidation costs in
the event of a run, create the incentives for a government to implement costly reforms. The
second paper shows that if currency crises are triggered by a coordination failure among creditors,
international bailouts sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventive
actions, as IMF’s decisions are strategic complements to the adjustment effort of the country and
the roll-over decisions of private creditors.- 6 -
In this paper, we show that the introduction of a dynamic value effect reinforces the case for
contingent country insurance, the more so the longer the effective planning horizon of the
policymaker. Similarly, we ￿nd that the presence of self-ful￿lling liquidity runs provides an
additional rationale in favor of insurance, this time by reducing the incidence of exogenous events
on the probability of facing crises that erode reform payoffs and undermine reform incentives.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the model and derives the main
analytical results. Section III discusses more in depth the implications of the nature of reforms,
as well as the more practical question of implementability. Section IV presents extensions that
examine the role of the value effect and the presence of self-ful￿lling crises. Finally, Section V
extracts some policy implications and concludes.
II. THE MODEL
To discuss the different effects that a country insurance policy may have on policymakers’
incentives to undertake reforms, we consider the following stylized framework. At the beginning
of the period, the policymaker inherits a ￿xed amount of debt and decides on the amount of
reform effort he is willing to undertake. A reformist attitude (high effort) increases the probability
of avoiding a crisis in the long run, but at the same time, reduces the policymaker’s ability to reap
immediate political returns (which may include political patronage or fund diversion). After the
effort decision is made, an exogenous state of nature (representing macroeconomic fundamentals)
is revealed. In the absence of insurance, the probability of being unable to repay creditors at the
end of the period (henceforth, a ￿crisis￿) is a function of macroeconomic fundamentals and the
reform effort previously chosen.
5
We assume that, unlike the returns from short-run policies, returns from reform take time to
materialize and depend on the evolution of the macroeconomic environment.
6 In addition, to
capture the fact that the effective cost of a crisis in￿uences reform incentives (alternatively, the
moral hazard problem associated with insurance), we assume that a crisis event has speci￿c real
effects (which translate into a political cost to the government) above and beyond those related to
macroeconomic fundamentals, and that the implementation of reforms reduces the likelihood of a
crisis episode.
5The fact that we rule out partial repayment is just for the sake of simplicity and does not affect
our main results.
6There are a number of ways in which reforms may increase the government’s utility, including
through a raise in productivity (if the country’s income is an argument of the government’s
objetive function) or through an improvement of the ef￿ciency of tax collection (if the
government’s income, and its allocation, is an argument of the government objetctive function).
The way in which the political returns of reforms differ according to the country’s macroeconomic
and ￿nancial context will depend on the nature of the reform. We come back to this issue in
Section III.- 7 -
Three alternative cases are considered: a benchmark under which no insurance is provided
(denote by NI), and two alternative insurance contracts that stipulate the conditions under
which an ￿insurer￿ provides the funds needed to repay lenders in the event of insolvency: a
blanket insurance (BI) that insures the borrower against insolvency in all states, and a contingent
insurance (CI) that provides the funds only in bad states of nature.
7 Note that an insurance
contract could, in principle, be written as a function of realized reform effort. In practice, however,
the measurement and veri￿ability of reform is bound to be contestable, to an extent that may
prevent the enforcement of the contract. To capture this limitation, we assume that reform effort is
not veri￿able and thus cannot be used to condition the provision of insurance.
Depending on the case under consideration, the country may face three possible scenarios:
solvency (when we henceforth denote as ￿tranquil￿ times); insolvency, where default is avoided
through the activation of the insurance policy (￿turbulent￿ times), and insolvency followed by
default (a ￿crisis￿). The distinction between the last two scenarios re￿ects the fact that, while
insurance may save the country the additional costs of a crisis, it does not fully eliminate the real
consequences of the adverse macroeconomic conditions that led to insolvency in the ￿rst place.
More formally, we assume that insolvency occurs with probability ￿j = 1 ￿ sje, where e
denotes the government’s reform effort, associated with a quadratic opportunity cost c(e) = e2
that represents the forgone returns from alternative short-run policies. The stochastic variable
sj, j = B, G, denotes an observable exogenous state of nature, where the subscripts B and G
refer to ￿good￿ and ￿bad￿ states, so that sB < sG < 1. In this simple set-up, for a given level
of effort, the probability of insolvency is higher in bad states; for a given state, insolvency is
more likely when reform effort has been low. For expositional simplicity, we further assume that
Pr(sB) = Pr(sG) = 1
2, and that sB = ￿ ￿ ￿; sG = ￿ + ￿. These two assumptions imply that
the ex-ante probability of insolvency is given by ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿e. From now on, we refer to ￿ as
the expected state of nature (alternatively, expected macroeconomic fundamentals), and to ￿ as
exogenous volatility, and we assume that ￿ ￿ ￿.
As noted before, we assume that reform effort generates ￿returns￿ to the government. We let such
returns be equal to ￿ in tranquil times, to ￿ in turbulent times, and to ￿ in crisis periods. In order
to rule out the trivial cases in which country insurance is either always or never optimal, we work
under the assumption that
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. (A.1)
In addition, we assume that the occurrence of a crisis entails an additional ￿xed cost to the
government equal to C, such that:
7In the context of our model, it is easy to show that all feasible contracts are strictly dominated by










Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) ensure that, in equilibrium, the ex-post probability of insolvency
is non negative and less than one (i.e., ￿j 2 [0;1)). Finally, the assumption that, in the event
of insolvency, reform payoffs are higher if the country is insured captures the effort-increasing
incentive (the ￿carrot￿) of the insurance policy. The rewards for reforms decline both with
deteriorating fundamentals and with the unraveling of a debt crisis. Insurance cannot eliminate
the former, but helps avoid the latter.
8 This effect is counterbalanced by the standard moral
hazard effect introduced by the insurance policy which, in our framework, is associated with the
elimination of the ￿xed cost of a crisis, C, in those states in which the insurance is activated.
9
Figure 1 summarizes the dynamic structure of the model.
The problem of the government in the absence of insurance is given by
Max
e UNI = ￿￿e
2 + (1 ￿ ￿e)(￿e ￿ C) ￿ e
2; (1)






2(1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿))
: (2)
As expected, the optimal level of effort is a positive function of the cost of a crisis (
@e￿
NI
@C > 0) and
the expected quality of macroeconomic fundamental (
@e￿
NI
@￿ > 0). Effort also increases with the
reform payoff in tranquil times (
@e￿
NI
@￿ > 0). The reform payoff during a crisis, ￿, has, however,
an ambiguous effect on policymakers’ willingness to undertake reforms. A higher value of ￿, by
reducing the loss associated with defaults, raises the payoff of reforms. However, it also weakens
the incentives to reduce the probability of insolvency. In the Appendix, we show that the ￿rst
effect dominates the second when the cost of the crisis is low enough, a situation in which the
disciplinary effect of a crisis is necessarily limited.
8A natural way to interpret this assumption is to think of ￿ ￿ ￿ as the result of a lower cost of
capital under unfavorable macroeconomic conditions when the country’s repayment capacity is
preserved (at least partially) by the insurance policy.
9In its simplicity, our model seems to rule out the possibility of moral hazard in the absence
of insurance. However, moral hazard would still be present whenever the bene￿ts and costs of
reform for the government differ from those for its constituency. Trivially, as the cost of the crisis
borne by the government declines (as C approaches zero), the policymaker will be increasingly
tempted to reduce effort.
10A formal derivation of the results reported in the text is presented in the Appendix.- 9 -
The introduction of a blanket insurance policy that guarantees creditors whenever the country
becomes insolvent (a case denoted by the subscript BI) modi￿es the problem to:
Max
e UBI = ￿￿e
2 + (1 ￿ ￿e)￿e ￿ e
2; (3)





2(1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿))
: (4)
Again, reform effort increases with the quality of macroeconomic fundamentals (
@e￿
BI
@￿ > 0) and
with reform payoffs in tranquil (
@e￿
BI
@￿ > 0) and turbulent times (
@e￿
BI
@￿ > 0). As expected, under a
blanket insurance policy, the disciplinary effect of the crisis is bound to play no role.
Finally, we study the effects of a contingent insurance policy (denoted by the subscript CI), under
which insurance is provided exclusively in bad times (s = sB). The government’s problem can
now be rewritten as:
Max




(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)e)￿e +
1
2
(1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)e)(￿e ￿ C) ￿ e
2; (5)




￿ + ￿ + C(￿ + ￿)
2(2(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿ + ￿))
: (6)




@C > 0), the expected state of nature (
@e￿
CI




@￿ > 0). The reform payoffs in turbulent (￿) and in crisis times (￿) have, however,
an ambiguous effect on policymakers’ willingness to undertake reforms. As in the no-insurance
case, the reform payoff during a crisis, ￿, has a positive effect on policymakers’ willingness to
undertake reforms only when the political costs of the crisis are low enough. The same is true for
the reform payoffs in turbulent times: only when the disciplinary effect of the crisis is limited does
the insurance effect dominate the moral hazard effect under a contingent insurance policy.
We are now in a position to compare the reform effort under the three different cases outlined
above, and see under which conditions country insurance schemes foster or hinder reform effort.
Result 1 (i) If crisis costs are very low (C < C1 ￿
(￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿￿￿￿)
(￿+￿)(1￿(￿￿￿)￿)), the reform effort is highest
under a blanket insurance, and lowest under the no insurance regime (eBI > eCI > eNI);
(ii) If crisis costs are low (C1 < C < C2 ￿
(￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1￿(￿￿￿)￿)), the reform effort is highest under
conditional insurance and lowest under no insurance (eCI > eBI > eNI);
(iii) If crisis costs are high (C2 < C < C3 ￿
(￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿+￿￿)
(￿￿￿)(1￿(￿￿￿)￿)), the reform effort is highest under
conditional insurance, and lowest under blanket insurance (eCI > eNI > eBI);
(iv) If crisis costs are very high (C > C3), the reform effort is highest under no insurance, and
lowest under a blanket insurance (eNI > eCI > eBI).- 10 -
Proof: See Appendix.
To grasp the intuition of these results, it is best to start by comparing the no-insurance and
blanket-insurance cases. First, notice that the main force at work is the interplay between the
motivating carrot of insurance, captured by the difference between the reform payoff in turbulent
and crisis times, and the dissuasive stick of crisis costs, which the insurance policy necessarily
attenuates. It is not surprising, then, that if the stick is large enough, reform effort will be lower
under an unconditional insurance policy. Conversely, a small stick would imply a minor moral
hazard problem as a result of a blanket insurance, tilting the carrot-stick balance in favor of the
former.
The moral hazard aspect detracts from the bene￿ts of the blanket insurance when the cost of
the crisis increases. This effect can be attenuated by conditioning the insurance policy to the
realization of a bad shock. The reason this might be ￿incentive compatible￿ is well known in
principal-agent models.
11 Indeed, state-contingent insurance increases the value of effort in those
states in which a failure is most likely to be the consequence of external circumstances (a bad
shock) and preserves the stick in those states in which a failure is most likely to be associated with
insuf￿cient reform. In terms of the previous trade-off, this contingent policy entails both a smaller
carrot (since it is now available only in the event of a bad shock) and a weaker stick (effective
only if the country becomes insolvent under good macroeconomic conditions). However, the ￿rst
effect is proportionally smaller than the second one, improving upon a blanket insurance as moral
hazard becomes important (C > C1), and leading to more reform than under the no-insurance
case as long as moral hazard does not become an overwhelming concern (C < C3).
A clearer intuition of the conditioning mechanism can be obtained with the help of a limiting
example in which a bad shock causes insolvency with certainty (￿ = ￿; so that sB = 0).
Substituting these values in the ￿rst order conditions of the maximization problem, it follows
immediately that the difference in the marginal utility of reform effort between the contingent-




@e ) is simply given by
(￿￿￿)
2 . In this case,
the only effect of the introduction of insurance is a higher return on reforms contingent on a bad
shock. The moral hazard component, on the other hand, disappears because, in this extreme
situation, reform has no incidence on the probability of insolvency under adverse macroeconomic
conditions.
The above example suggests that the effectiveness of country insurance contracts in fostering
reforms depends not only on the reform payoffs under different scenarios, but also on the expected
state of nature and its volatility. More precisely, if the case for country insurance is built on its
ability to foster reform effort, we have that:
11The classical reference is H￿lmstrom (1988). In our set-up, the probability that insolvency is
caused by the policymaker’s lack of reform effort is proportional to the realization of the state sj.
This implies that reform effort satis￿es Milgrom’s (1988) monotone likelihood ratio property, and
ensures that the ￿optimal￿ insurance policy is, loosely speaking, monotonic in sj.- 11 -
Result 2 (i) The higher the probability of a crisis for a given level of reform (the lower ￿), the
stronger the case for insurance;
(ii) The higher the exogenous volatility (￿), the stronger the case for contingent insurance;
Proof: See Appendix.
These results suggest that crisis-prone volatile economies would be natural candidates for country
insurance. Indeed, in the presence of good and stable macroeconomic conditions, the moral hazard
component of insurance is likely to undermine the already high expected reform payoffs. By
contrast, when these payoffs are downgraded by a highly unpredictable macroeconomic context,
country insurance strengthens reform incentives, while moral hazard is bound to play a lesser
role. Then, it is not surprising that a large exogenous volatility reinforces the case for conditional
insurance. Under such policy, the insurance is in place only in those states in which moral hazard
effects are necessarily subdued, preserving the disciplining effect of crisis costs in those states in
which moral hazard is more likely to be a concern.
III. INSURANCE AND REFORMS
The simpli￿ed model presented above highlights the main trade-offs underscoring much of the
discussion on international safety nets and, in particular, their effect on government moral hazard.
In this section, we specialize the analysis to better illuminate its policy implications. More
precisely, we ￿rst look at how the insurance-incentive nexus depends on the nature of the reform
under scrutiny. Then, we address the critical issue of the insurance contract’s implementation
costs.
A. Enhancing Versus Buffering Reforms
Following the existing literature, we use the term ￿reforms￿ to denote a diverse set of government
policies that, by enhancing long-run productivity and fostering growth, increase the country’s
resilience in periods of ￿nancial distress. The implementation of such policies, however, often
entails a short-term (political if not economic) cost. In our model, the effects of reforms are
captured by their payoffs under the three different states (and their difference across states).
12
However, the relative payoffs under different scenarios (and, in turn, the impact of country
insurance) are likely to differ substantially according to the speci￿c nature of the reform under
consideration.
12Notice that we implicitly assume that reform effort precedes the realization of the shock, so
that the associated reform costs are incurred ex-ante and are, therefore, state-independent. This
situation in which these costs differ across states can be encompassed in our model simply by
assuming that reform payoffs in each different state are net of the state-contingent component of
reform costs.- 12 -
For instance, deregulation (or government retrenchment) that tends to enhance productivity across
the board maximizes its political dividend under a favorable macroeconomic context. Similarly,
privatization of state-owned utilities may raise ef￿ciency under all scenarios but, by increasing the
rigidity of utilities prices, may entail substantial political costs during turbulent and crisis periods.
By contrast, prudential reforms that increase capitalization and liquidity ratios of domestic banks
may attenuate the impact of an adverse shock and the costs of a crisis, at the expense of wider
intermediation margins in tranquil times. Likewise, tax reforms that improve ￿scal accounts at
the cost of a higher effective tax burden, by making government revenues less procyclical and
broadening the scope for countercyclical ￿scal policy, are particularly helpful under adverse
macroeconomic conditions, but may be politically costly in periods of bonanza.
Broadly speaking, then, reforms could be de￿ned as ￿enhancing￿ or ￿buffering,￿ according to
whether their payoffs are relatively higher or lower in tranquil times vis ￿ vis crisis times. More
generally, the distinction hinges upon whether they spread or compress the distribution of returns
across states in the absence of insurance. In our model, this distinction can be simply captured
by the difference in the parameters that determine reform payoffs under solvency and insolvency,
(￿ ￿ ￿): the more buffering the nature of the reform, the smaller this difference.
13 In order to
illustrate this point, we can assume that ￿ = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ k)"; ￿ = ￿ + k", 0 < k < 1, where a larger
value of " would be associated with a lager enhancing effect. It is now easy to show that:
Result 3 The scope for reform-inducing country insurance policies increases with the enhancing
nature of reforms.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition behind this result is the following. Due to their self-insurance nature, buffering
reforms by reducing the difference of returns across states are partial substitutes for the country
insurance policies discussed above. As a result, the presence of the latter reduces the need for the
former. Conversely, enhancing reforms associated with a larger difference in payoffs across states
are complemented by an insurance policy that preserves the value of effort in turbulent times. As
a result, the presence of insurance would tend to stimulate the latter at the expense of the former.
B. Is Country Insurance Feasible?
While desirable under certain conditions, effort-inducing insurance policies such as those
described above are costly, bearing the question of whether a government would be willing to pay
up-front a fair insurance fee to the insurer if the insurance policy were available.
13In addition, some buffering reforms (e.g., bank liquidity requirements or social safety nets)
may lead directly to a reduction of the deadweight loss of a crisis, C. This case can be readily
represented as a change in ￿, by replacing the ￿xed cost of the crisis C with a (slightly) more
general C (e) = C ￿ ￿e, where a buffering reform may be characterized by ￿ > 0. In turn, the
marginal return on reform in crisis times would now equal ￿ = ￿ + ￿; reducing the scope for
country insurance (since
@C3
@￿ < 0).- 13 -
In order to show that this would indeed be the case, let’s extend our framework along the following
lines: Assume that policymakers’ utility (in the initial period) is a decreasing function of the
interest rate they are charged; and that a fairly priced insurance is available in the market. Also
assume that, at the moment of deciding whether to buy the insurance or not, the country has to
borrow from the international capital market (or to re￿nance its stock of existing debt); and that
risk-neutral creditors charge a spread over the risk free rate that compensates for the probability
of default. Notice that, as long as insurance increases effort, it also reduces the probability of
default. This in turns implies that the cost of re￿nancing the debt (net of the insurance premium)
is necessarily lower when the country is insured than when it is not. Then, given that the policy
does not involve an economic costs to the country (if anything, it results in an economic gain), a
suf￿cient condition for policymakers to be willing to purchase a fairly priced (effort-inducing)
insurance policy is that it increases their own utility relative to the no-insurance case. The
following results builds upon this intuition:
Result 4 A government will always be willing to purchase a reform-inducing country insurance
at a fair premium.
Proof: See Appendix.
The previous theoretical argument, while appealing, ignores important practical considerations.
First, the size of the stock of net ￿nancial liabilities in most emerging economies exceeds the
￿nancial capacity and diversi￿cation scope of any private agent or consortium of agents. Second,
even if a consortium of insurers could credibly provide this contract for smaller economies, it
is unlikely that the insured government can prevent the insurer, as sovereign risk mounts, from
hedging its growing exposure by shortening the country’s debt, feeding back into the crisis
dynamics.
14 Finally, the inverse moral hazard problem (speci￿cally, the lack of mechanisms to
ensure the solvency of the insurer) should not be underestimated, particularly in an international
context.
In light of the dif￿culties previously mentioned, many observers have suggested that IFIs should
play the role of country insurers.
15 While the IFIs are unlikely to overcome the size problem, they
are free from inverse moral hazard, and lees constrained by the need to hedge their exposure.
14The same logic applies to currency risk: private insurers may accelerate a currency collapse
by short-selling the local currency to hedge their exposure. Note the underlying coordination
problem: although insurers are aware that by their hedging they increase the probability of a
collapse, their individual negative impact is diluted in the aggregate while the bene￿ts from
hedging accrue entirely to them. Thus, this argument implicitely assumes that no bank will be
willing or able to insure a country by itself. See Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for a detailed
discussion of the practical obstacles for private country insurance.
15Fischer (1999) argues that the IMF has in practice functioned as an international lender of last
resort, and has called for changes in the international ￿nancial architecture to acknowledged this
function and improve its effectiveness. See also Eichengreen (1999) for a survey.- 14 -
Thus, IFIs are in a privileged position to provide at least partial insurance schemes.
16 In this
regard, our analysis adds to this view from a different dimension. By showing that a more active
(and explicit) role of the IFIs as country insurers may not necessarily lead to a delay in the
implementation of pending reforms, our ￿ndings strongly qualify the traditional moral hazard
criticism of the role of IFIs as country insurers. A note of caution is in order in the case of
contingent insurance, particularly since the international constituency of IFIs may weaken their
capacity to condition their assistance once a crisis erupts. However, even in this case, an explicit
insurance facility may dominate implicit ones by reducing the IFI’s discretionary margin.
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IV. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we extend our analysis to address two additional channels, recently discussed in
the literature, whose interaction with country insurance schemes might signi￿cantly affect reform
incentives. First, we sketch a dynamic version of our model to illustrate the way in which country
insurance may in￿uence the behavior of forward looking policymakers. Second, we allow for
the possibility of self-ful￿lling crises, to show how, in such circumstances, the positive effects of
country insurance are magni￿ed.
A. Value Effect
In a multi-period banking model, Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003) show that a state-contingent
bailout policy, by decreasing the probability of a crisis, may enhance the expected continuation
value of the borrower and, through this channel, the payoff of engaging in safer investment
practices. A similar argument can be applied in the case of country insurance. In order to better
understand the impact of insurance on the value at risk of the insured country (or, more precisely,
of its government) we extend our static model to a multi-period setup with a similar timing of
events. To capture the fact that access to this continuation value is uncertain, we assume that the
government, which is reelected with a certain probability every non-crisis period, is forced to step
down whenever a crisis occurs.






16Note that, unless they are fully guaranteed by their non-borrowing shareholders, even IFIs may
not be able to absorb unlimited risk without compromising their solvency. In practice, however,
due both to those guarantees and to their superior enforcement technology, IFIs should better
equipped than private ￿nancial institutions to offer limited liquidity assistance facilities (much in
the same way as a domestic lender of last resort).
17Ultimately, as suggested by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003), inasmuch as political pressures
foster indiscriminate bailouts at the expense of conditionality, an explicit acknowledgment
appears to be preferable to the customary constructive ambiguity approach.
18The assumption is for expositional simplicity. The argument carries through as long as the
probability of reelection declines with a crisis.- 15 -
where ￿ represents the combination of the government’s discount rate and the probability of
reelection, and k = NI, BI, CI, with qNI = ￿e; qBI = 1; and qCI = 1
2(1 + (￿ + ￿)e). The ￿rst















The ￿rst thing to note is that, under standard regularity conditions, the incentives to reform
depends positively on the second term between brackets. This, in turn, increases with the
continuation value, Vk, and with the incidence of the government’s own effort on its probability
of surviving to access this continuation value. In this context, country insurance introduces two
countervailing effects. On the one hand, it weakens the link between effort and the probability of
survival, lessening reform incentives. On the other, by increasing the probability of survival, it
raises the continuation value, stimulating reform. We refer to the latter as the ￿value effect.￿
Under a blanket insurance this value effect disappears, since qBI = 1 for all levels of effort so
that the probability of re-election is independent of the government’s actions. It is easy to verify,
then, that the new threshold cost of a crisis, b C1, such that a blanket insurance policy increases
effort relative to the no-insurance case, would be smaller in this extended setup. This is because
the introduction of a continuation value increases effort under the no-insurance case, but has no
impact under a blanket insurance, thus weakening the case for the latter.
More interesting is the case of contingent insurance. Here, the differential impact of the





for any given value of e; can be shown (see Appendix) to be positive if




Thus, if macroeconomic shocks are suf￿ciently disperse (in particular, if bad shocks are
suf￿ciently extreme), the value effect increases reform incentives under a contingent insurance
policy proportionally more than it does in the absence of insurance.
19
Note that the effort enhancing channel discussed in section 2 is complemented by this dynamic
value effect. In the static case, insurance increases the political payoffs of reform when the
country faces an adverse macroeconomic shock. In the dynamic case, by reducing the impact of
exogenous shocks on political survival, insurance increases the policymakers’ continuation value
and their willingness to embrace reforms that further enhance their chances of remaining in power.
19Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003) ￿nd that a bank bailout policy contingent on macroeconomic
shocks being below certain threshold reduces banks’ risk appetite. One can invert their proposition
by saying that the existence of risk-reducing cotingent bailouts requires a positive probability of
suf￿ciently bad shocks. Note the similarity of the result discussed here in a different context.- 16 -
This dynamic value effect yields several interesting implications. First, as in the static version,
and for the same reasons, high macroeconomic volatility reinforces the case for contingent
country insurance. Second, from condition (8), the case for contingent insurance is stronger
when ￿ is large, that is, when governments are relatively more forward looking. Accordingly,
political/institutional factors that tend to undercut the incumbent’s chances of remaining in of￿ce
(such as the lack of party discipline or, more generally, an instable political environment) would
weaken the incidence of the value effect.
Note, in passing, that, for any given value of crisis costs C, a contingent insurance contract would
increase reform effort for (and, as a result, would be willingly purchased by) high-￿ governments
as opposed to low-￿ ones. Thus, for any given distribution of macroeconomic shocks, a contingent
insurance contract could potentially be used as a screening device to separate committed from
opportunistic governments.
B. Self-Ful￿lling Crises
Our simple model could be easily extended to allow for the possibility that a crisis may be
triggered by self-ful￿lling liquidity runs that are largely independent of government actions and
can be prevented by the presence of an explicit insurance policy. More precisely, assume that, in
the states of the world in which no insurance is provided, the probability of a crisis is given by
~ ￿ = 1 ￿ (sje + ￿), where the tildes denote this new scenario in which self-ful￿lling crises are
possible. Accordingly, a smaller ￿ increases the likelihood of a crisis for given macroeconomic
fundamentals and reform effort, weakening the effect of fundamentals and effort on the probability
of avoiding a crisis.
20
Note that the presence of self-ful￿lling crises adds to the impact of exogenous factors in the
probability of a crisis. As a result, it introduces an additional channel through which insurance
enhances the marginal returns on reform effort. Then, if insurance was preferred in the absence
of self-ful￿lling crises, it will be more so in their presence; on the other hand, if no insurance was
preferred, then the bene￿cial effect of insurance on the probability of a self-ful￿lling crises could
tilt the balance in favor of insurance.
More generally, the thresholds below which the insurance effect dominates are shifted up.
Formally, it is easy to verify (see Appendix) that, in this new set-up, effort will be higher under
a blanket insurance than under no insurance (~ eBI > ~ eNI) whenever C < ~ C2 < C2. Similarly,
eCI > eNI whenever C < ~ C3 < C3:
Accordingly, the case for country insurance (both conditional and unconditional) is reinforced
once we allow for self-ful￿lling crises. This is not surprising, given that the net bene￿ts of
insurance are directly related to the exogeneity of the factors underlying the crises. In the limiting
case in which crises are solely due to liquidity runs beyond the
20We implicitly assume that ￿ is small enough so that the probability of a crisis is always between
zero and one.- 17 -
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented a simple analytical framework to address the incentive effects associated
with country insurance, and it identi￿ed an important channel through which insurance can foster
reforms. By reducing the probability that deteriorating fundamentals evolve into full-blown crises,
country insurance schemes may enhance the expected political payoffs of reforms, increasing
reform incentives.
We argued that this channel would tend to be particularly effective in crisis-prone volatile
economies, and for enhancing reforms that pay off relatively more handsomely in good times. By
contrast, buffering reforms that tend to offset the impact of adverse shocks may be discouraged
by insurance-type international safety nets. It follows that the effects of the latter on government
moral hazard depend crucially on the nature of the speci￿c policies under consideration, as well
as on countries’ political and institutional features.
Having shown that, under certain conditions, an incentive-compatible country insurance scheme
is feasible, it remains to discuss how this scheme fares in terms of other alternatives. In particular,
while we assumed that crisis costs were exogenously given, it follows from the previous analysis
that an alternative way to guarantee that reforms are undertaken consists in raising such costs.
Indeed, this argument underscores the basic approach to the debt crisis problem adopted by those
that tend to see moral hazard as an overriding concern.
21
One has to bear in mind, however, that the relevant crisis costs are those imposed on the decision
makers (in our case, the governments) that are often only partially correlated with the economic
situation. For instance, a populist government may gain substantial political rents (in time of
economic distress) blaming external factors (past governments, the international environment,
￿evil lenders,￿ and even the IFIs) for the dismal income effect of the crisis, thereby reducing its
political costs.
22 At any rate, even abstracting from a possible Samaritan’s dilemma, it might not
always be feasible for the international community to increase the pain of a defaulting government
to any desired level.
Moreover, substantive crisis cost, while leading to deeper reform, would imply a loss for the
government (and for the economy as a whole) should the crisis nonetheless occur. It follows that,
for any level of reform effort attainable through the provision of country insurance, the stick of
higher crisis cost is welfare-dominated by the carrot of insurance. This, of course, does not deny
the positive effect a stick may have on the willingness to reform and the related probability of a
crisis. Indeed, it follows from our analysis that there are cases in which effort levels associated
with suf￿ciently large crisis costs cannot be reached through country insurance. However, as these
21In line with this view, moral hazard hardliners advocate strict limits to international rescue
packages and warn against changes in ￿nancial contracts, such as collective action clauses or
international bankruptcy procedures that may mitigate the (disciplinary) cost of default.
22This is particularly so whenever the punishment is perceived domestically as disproportionally
large.- 18 -
costs are mostly wasted resources, larger sticks, if feasible, would lead to more disciplined, but
poorer countries.
23
Ultimately, the way in which this carrot and stick trade-off plays out in the real world would
depend, as is always the case, on a number of case-speci￿c factors. Furthermore, while the
empirical assessment of the moral hazard effect has proved to be elusive, the still untested
insurance effect is likely to be as dif￿cult to elucidate. However, a few recent experiences might
provide preliminary insights on how international ￿nancial safety nets might help creating positive
incentive effects.
Among the latest ￿nancial crises, perhaps the two episodes that more closely illustrate the
incentive effects of rescue packages are Mexico (1994) and Brazil (2002). In the ￿rst case,
the country was offered a prompt bailout package that helped prevent default. In the second, a
generous safety net was provided in a timely way to help the country get through the turbulence
of an election year. The aftermath of these episodes is illuminating. The Mexican bailout,
heavily criticized at the time for its moral hazard consequences, led instead to a rapid sequence of
reforms.
24 In addition, the government obtained primary ￿scal surpluses in every year since then,
which helped to almost halve the debt-to-GDP ratio,
25 while substituting local-currency domestic
debt for foreign-currency external obligations (a recognized source of external vulnerability),
policies that certainly contributed to the country’s achievement of an investment grade rating. In
Brazil, in turn, IMF assistance was followed by a ￿scal tightening and a partial de-dollarization of
government liabilities to enhance debt sustainability, and advances on the social security and tax
reform fronts, implemented by the same policymakers who had triggered market jitters in the run
up to the election. Overall, rather than the surge of opportunistic populism that the moral hazard
view envisaged, the two countries exhibited sensible policies in line with the insurance effect
examined in this paper.
23Hence, Mussa’s (1999) claim that ￿the problems of moral hazard that are inevitably associated
with [international ￿nancial support] are modest in comparison with the real hazards that such
efforts seek to ameliorate (p. 235).￿
24These include a ￿nancial reform that raised prudential standards and opened the banking system
to foreign ownership, a social security reform that launched a system of pension funds that helped
developing the domestic capital market, a still ongoing tax reform, and a selective privatization
process.
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APPENDIX
Differentiating the maximand in (1) with respect to e we have that
@UNI
@e
= ￿2e(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿) + (￿C + ￿) = 0; (A-1)





2(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)
:
Note that the ex-post probability of a crisis in each state is such that 0 ￿ ￿G < ￿B < 1, since
assumption (A.1) implies that e￿
NI > 0 (which, in turn, ensures that ￿B < 1), and C ￿ ￿
￿, from
assumption (A.2), implies that 0 ￿ ￿G.
Differentiating e￿
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1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ C￿2
2(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)2 > 0 , C <
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿2 : (A-5)
Differentiating the maximand in (3) with respect to e we have that
@UBI
@e
= ￿2e(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿) + ￿ = 0; (A-6)
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:
As before, 0 ￿ ￿G < ￿B < 1, since assumption (A.1) ensures that e￿
BI > 0 and the ex-post
probability of a crisis is in this case always non-negative.
Finally, differentiating e￿


















2(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)2 > 0: (A-9)
Again, 0 ￿ ￿G < ￿B < 1, from assumption (A.1) (which ensures that e￿
NI > 0) and C ￿
￿+￿
￿+￿,
from assumption (A.2) (which implies that 0 ￿ ￿G).
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Proof of Result 1
By a simple comparison of (2), (4), and (6), it is straightforward to verify that
eCI > eBI , C > C1 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)
(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)
;
eNI > eBI , C > C2 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)
;
eNI > eCI , C > C3 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)
:
The fact that C3 > C2 > C1 > 0, completes the proof.
Proof of Result 2
Using Result 1,














Proof of Result 3
To prove the proposition, it suf￿ces to show that
@C3
@" > 0. Replacing ￿ = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ k)" and
￿ = ￿ + k" into C3, de￿ne
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Proof of Result 4
It is enough to show that UBI (eBI) > UNI (eNI) for eBI > eNI, and UCI (e) > UNI (e) for







that UBI (eBI) < UNI (eNI) for eBI > eNI. UCI (eCI) < UNI (eNI) for eCI > eNI follows from a
similar argument.
Value effect
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so that a suf￿cient condition for the inequality to hold is that (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) < 0 or
￿ > 1 ￿
￿
￿
:- 24 - APPENDIX
Self-ful￿lling crises
Government’s problems under the three scenarios can be written as:
Max
e




~ UBI = ￿￿e
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:
We then have that
~ eCI > ~ eBI , C > ~ C1 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)





~ eNI > ~ eBI , C > ~ C2 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)





~ eNI > ~ eCI , C > ~ C3 ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿)
+
+
￿(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 + (￿ ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)
;
from which it follows immediately that ~ C1 > C1, ~ C2 > C2 and ~ C3 > C3:- 25 -
REFERENCES
Barro, R., 1998, ￿The IMF Doesn’t Put Out Fires, It Starts Them,￿ Business Week (December 7),
pp. 18.
Broda, C., and E. Levy-Yeyati, 2003, ￿Dollarization and the Lender of Last Resort,￿ in
Dollarization: Debates and Policy Alternatives, ed. by E. Levy-Yeyati, and F. Sturzenegger,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
Caballero, R., K. Cowan, and J. Kearns, 2003, ￿Fear from Sudden Stops: Lessons from Australia
and Chile,￿ NBER Working Paper No. 10519 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: NBER).
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi, 2003, ￿Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate, and
Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s Lessons,￿ NBER Working Paper No. 9828 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: NBER).
Chang, R., and A. Velasco, 2001, ￿A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,￿ Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, pp. 489￿517.
Cordella, T., and E. Levy Yeyati, 2003, ￿Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect,￿ Journal
of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 12, pp. 300￿30.
Corsetti, G., B. Guimarªes, and N. Roubini, 2003, ￿International Lending of Last Resort and
Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Cathalytic Finance.￿ Available via the Internet at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~corsetti/euro/imf.pdf.
De la Torre, A., E. Levy Yeyati, and S. Schmukler, 2003, ￿Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The
Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board,￿ Economia, Vol. 3, pp. 43￿99.
Dell’Ariccia, G., I. Schnabel, and J. Zettelmeyer, 2002,￿Moral Hazard and International Crisis
Lending: A Test,￿ IMF Working Paper No. 02/181 (Washington: International Monetary
Fund).
Dornbusch, R., I. Goldfajn and R. Valdes, 1995, ￿Currency Crises and Collapses,￿ Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, pp. 219￿93.
Eichengreen, B. ,1999, Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia
Agenda (Washington: IIE Press).
￿￿, and R. Hausmann (forthcoming), ￿Original Sin: the Road to Redemption,￿ in Debt
Denomination and Financial Instability in Emerging-Market Economies, ed. by B.
Eichengreen, and R. Hausmann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Fisher, S.,1999, ￿On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort,￿ Journal of Economic
Perspective, Vol. 13, pp. 85￿104.
Grif￿th-Jones, S., 2003, ￿The Lack of Stable Capital Flows to Developing Countries,￿ in
Financial Stability and Growth in Emerging Economies: The Role of the Financial Sector,
ed. by J.J. Teunissen and M. Teunissen (The Hague, Netherlands: Forum on Debt and
Development).- 26 -
Haldane, A., and A. Taylor, 2003, ￿Moral Hazard: How Does IMF Lending Affect Debtor and
Creditor Incentives?￿ Financial Stability Review, Vol. 14, pp. 122￿33.
Holmstr￿m, B., 1979, ￿Moral Hazard and Observability,￿ Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, pp.
74￿91.
Jeanne, O., and J. Zettelmeyer, 2001, ￿International Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Conditionality,￿
Economic Policy: A European Forum, Vol. 33, pp. 407￿24.
Lane, T., and S. Phillips, 2000, ￿Does IMF ￿nancing Results in Moral Hazard?￿ IMF Working
Paper 00/168 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Milgrom, P., 1981, ￿Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Application,￿ Bell
Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 369￿78.
Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 1998, ￿Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-ful￿lling Currency
Attacks,￿ American Economic Review, Vol. 88, pp. 587￿97.
￿￿, 2003, ￿Cathalytic Finance: When Does It Work?￿ Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
No. 1400 (Connecticut: Yale University).
Mussa, M., 1999, ￿Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard
and Containing Real Hazard,￿ paper presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia Conference
on Capital Flows and The International Financial System. Available via the Internet:
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/1999/Mussa.pdf.
Perry, G., and L. Serven, 2002, ￿La Anatomia de Una Crisis Multiple: Que Tenia Argentina de
Especial y Que Podemos Aprender de Ella,￿ Desarrollo Economico, Vol. 42, pp. 323￿75.
Radelet, S., and J. Sachs., 1998, ￿The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis,￿ NBER Working
Paper No. 6680 (Cambridge, Massachussets: NBER).
Sachs, J., A. Tornell, and A. Velasco, 1996, ￿The Mexican Peso Crisis: Sudden Death or Death
Foretold?,￿ Journal of International Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 265￿83.
Zhang, X. A., 1999, ￿Testing for ‘Moral Hazard’ in Emerging Markets Lending,￿ Institute of
International Finance Research Paper No. 99/1.